Behaviorism’s mechanistic view of humans led to its most controversial claim: that humans do not freely choose their own behaviors. This claim seems counterintuitive because we all feel as if we decide consciously what we are going to do and then do it. Behaviorists, however, claimed that the feeling that we freely choose our behaviors is an illusion. They argued that, even if we allow mental causes back into experimental psychology, these mental events are caused by internal and external factors that precede them and, hence, that we still have no free will. Figure 1 provides an illustration and example of this point.
Figure 1. The determination of mental events by preceding causes
In Figure 1, the red stoplight causes the thought, "I must stop or I will get a ticket," a mental event that causes the pressing of the brake. Behaviorists assumed that, because of the person's learning history — the complete set of associations among stimuli and responses that make up the collection of behavioral tendencies acquired over a lifetime — this person had no choice when the stoplight turned red: he was compelled to think, "I must stop or I will get a ticket," which then compelled him to press the brake pedal. Thus, behaviorists assumed that the doctrine of determinism (see Section 3-1 and below) was true, regardless of whether one believed that (a) only external stimuli or (b) both external stimuli and internal mental events, caused behavior. Few behaviorists consistently asserted that only external stimuli (in conjunction with internal biological factors) caused behavior until the emergence of what came to be called radical behaviorism.
Radical Behaviorism
B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) rejected the idea that mental events cause behavior— an idea that, as we saw, many behaviorists thought was (probably) true but that they ignored because mental events are subjective (that is, they are not publicly observable). Skinner not only rejected the idea that mental events cause behavior, he argued that mental events are behavior. This claim was (and is) quite radical, which is why Skinner's approach eventually came to be known as radical behaviorism. He stated that mental events are behavior because they are caused by the same external and internal (biological) factors as are other behaviors. And, if we accept the claim that mental events are behavior, then they cannot cause behavior. If you are interested in knowing more about this aspect of Skinner's approach, please click here. [NOTE: I have not yet written this section.]
Skinner believed that everything a person does — from driving a car to studying for a test — occurs only through automatic (and typically learned) responses to environmental events. His mechanistic approach to understanding human behavior underscores two philosophical assumptions held by Skinner, materialism and determinism, which are assumptions held by all behaviorists. They were materialists because they assumed that only physical events cause behavior. Materialism is the doctrine that the the universe consists only of physical matter. If physical matter is the only reality, then everything in the universe can be explained only in terms of physical causes. And behaviorists also were determinists. As stated in Section 3-1, determinism is the doctrine that all events are caused by sequences of prior events. Because of these assumptions, behaviorists believed that all human behavior is caused by sequences of prior physical events. If this is true, it seems to follow that humans cannot exhibit free will (but see Dennett, 1984, 2004).
Probably the majority of behavioral scientists assume that all human behaviors are determined by sequences of prior physical events. For example, behavioral neuroscientists assume that all cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are determined by activity in the CNS and PNS. If mental states are produced by physical states of the brain, and if these physical states of the brain are produced by long sequences of preceding physical events, then the mind itself must be caused by long sequences of preceding physical events. This seems to contradict the doctrine of free will, which implies that, ”on a given occasion, with the past just as it was and the present and ourselves just as they are, we can choose or decide the opposite of what we actually do choose or decide” (Honderich, 1993, p. 2). The doctrine of determinism, on the other hand, implies that "every event that occurs is the only one that could have occurred in the circumstances” (Feinberg, 1989, p. 343). All theoretical approaches in scientific psychology assume that human mental processes and behaviors are determined by physical (material) factors. In other words, all approaches used by scientific psychologists assume that our minds and behavior are caused by sequences of prior physical events occurring in our bodies and in the environment.
Why do scientific psychologists adopt a deterministic and materialistic perspective when developing their theories? The answer is a simple one: these assumptions work for the practical everyday concerns of scientific psychologists, just as they do for you in your practical everyday concerns. That is, just as you are able fix a problem in your car's engine or relieve the symptoms of a cold by assuming that these problems are determined by physical factors, psychologists are able to explain, predict, and control the mental and behavioral phenomena they study by assuming that these phenomena are determined by physical factors. Furthermore, the close correspondence between states of the nervous system, on the one hand, and our cognitions, emotions, and behaviors, on the other hand, has provided support for the usefulness of these assumptions in designing and performing psychological research.
Is our intuitive sense that we freely choose our actions, and even our thoughts and emotions, merely an illusion? Are our choices really determined by physical events? If the answers to these questions are “yes,” what would this imply for religious beliefs about supernatural causes, such as the belief that our minds continue to exist after the death of our bodies? These are disturbing questions for all of us. Those who assume that determinism and materialism are true for all aspects of our lives give answers to these questions that differ greatly from the answers most of you have given to them since childhood (especially when based on religious teachings about the supernatural). The widespread acceptance of determinism and materialism by scientific psychologists since the late-nineteenth century is probably the most revolutionary aspect of this science. Yet, it is an issue that is rarely discussed by psychologists in their textbooks; and nonpsychologists often are unaware of the deterministic and materialistic nature of most psychological theories. Ignoring what is a central human concern seems to be a very strange way to proceed in a science dedicated to understanding human nature. But the impossibility of answering definitively the questions raised above, especially the impossibility of answering them in a scientifically meaningful way, is the reason that they are not often addressed in psychology courses.
What does scientific psychology have to say about people's religious beliefs? Most people, including most experimental psychologists and other scientists, would answer, "nothing." Scientific psychology tries to answer those questions about human nature that can be answered by assuming determinism and materialism are true. Perhaps, many would suggest, there are other questions that cannot be answered with these assumptions. The fact that there are many religious psychologists means that they have found ways to reconcile the materialistic and deterministic assumptions they hold when doing their research, and the religious assumptions and beliefs they hold in their personal lives. How one reconciles these two opposed sets of assumptions differs from one person to the next. If you wish to understand more about these issues, I recommend taking courses in philosphy and religious studies, as well as additional behavioral-science courses.
Study Questions for Section 5-6
- What controversial claim about the origins of our behavior was made by behaviorists?
- Why did B. F. Skinner reject the idea that mental events cause behavior?
- How did Skinner's rejection of mental causes differ from what behaviorists before him had believed?
- Which two philosophical assumptions were most important for the behavioristic approaches of Skinner and other experimental psychologists of his time? (Please define these assumptions in your own words.)
- What do these two assumptions imply regarding free will?
- Why do scientific psychologists make these two assumptions when performing their research and interpreting their findings?
- Why did I say that the "widespread acceptance of determinism and materialism by scientific psychologists since the late-nineteenth century is probably the most revolutionary aspect of this science"?
- What do the theories proposed by scientific psychologists about mind and behavior mean for people's religious beliefs? Why does it mean this for their religious beliefs?